Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
1992

An Interpretivist Agenda
Gary S. Lawson
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gary S. Lawson, An Interpretivist Agenda , in 15 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 157 (1992).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/941

This Article is brought to you for free and open access
by Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of
Law. For more information, please contact
lawlessa@bu.edu.

AN INTERPRETIVIST AGENDA
GARY S. LAWSON*

As I write these words, bevies of law clerks assigned to cases
involving the Bill of Rights are dutifully editing their bench
memos for publication in the national reporter system. Once
printed, these bench memos will be solemnly treated by lawyers, scholars, other law clerks, and the occasional judge who
runs across them as legally significant, or even binding, interpretations of the Constitution. Two features of this burgeoning
mass of otherwise unpublishable law review comments bear
mention. First, most of them are tedious, tendentious, pretentious, and badly reasoned when reasoned at all, just as one
would expect from authors who are one or two years out of law
school.' Second, many, if not most, of these law clerk opinions
bear no visible relationship to the actual words of the Bill of
Rights. In fact, it is possible to find opinions purportedly applying the Bill of Rights that never deem it necessary to quote the
amendments supposedly at issue.'
Those who embrace a stodgy, wooden, and formalistic approach to interpreting the Constitution tend to find this latter
state of affairs at best peculiar, and at worst pathetic. But while
I yield to no one in the stodginess, woodenness, and formalism
departments, I am nervous about leaping to such a conclusion
too quickly. Interpretivists still need to do some serious reflecting on the source of and justification for our distress over the
state of constitutional interpretation.
To some extent that process of reflection is underway and
has already borne fruit. Witness, for example, the almost total
substitution in the past half-decade of the principle of original
* Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. I do not mean to suggest that the clerks' employers, if left to their own devices,
are not equally capable of producing opinions that are tedious, tendentious, pretentious, and badly reasoned when reasoned at all. I maintain only that law clerks will
almost inevitably do so.
2. Upon examination, it turns out to be more possible than I had ever imagined.
During the October 1986 term, which I selected as a test period, the Supreme Court
decided fifty-four cases involving interpretation of the Bill of Rights, either directly or
via incorporation. According to my very quick and no doubt wildly unreliable count, in
thirty-four of those cases the majority or plurality opinion did not quote a single word
of any of the supposedly relevant constitutional provisions. A few of these opinions
gave tolerably accurate paraphrases of the amendments in question, but the overall
figures seem startling, even to me.
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meaning for the far less defensible principle of original intent-a substitution that probably would have taken much
longer if not for the efforts of certain friends and members of
the Federalist Society who recognized the need for re-examination of what had long been accepted as gospel.' But although
interpretivist thinking and scholarship have grown in sophistication in recent years, a substantial research program remains
uncompleted. Specifically, interpretivists who are unhappy with
the work product of our nation's Article III law clerks need to
do serious work on each of the three major problems of constitutional theory, which I unimaginatively call the problem of interpretation, the problem of justification, and the problem of
precedent. First, exactly how do you determine whether judicial interpretations are consistent with the Constitution? Second, why should anyone care whether judicial interpretations
are consistent with the Constitution? Finally, assuming that you
can identify inconsistent interpretations about which you
should care, how should they be dealt with? Mercifully, I have
no intention of solving these problems here,4 but I do want to
sketch out the research agenda these problems generate for
interpretivists.
Let us begin with the problem of interpretation. Interpretivists, as noted above, have made much progress in this area
by shifting their focus from a search for original intent-that is,
for the subjective meanings held by particular Framers or ratifiers-to a search for original meaning that is, for the public
understandings of the words used in the relevant documents.
Arguing for the primacy of original meaning, however, only addresses one-half of the problem of interpretation.5 To illustrate
this point, consider the proof of a simple fact at trial: Was the
3. The contributions to this interpretative revolution made by such figures as Robert
Bork, Edwin Meese, and Antonin Scalia are well known, at least to Federalist Society
members. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1989); Speech of
Attorney General Edwin Meese III (July 9, 1985), reprintedin THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITIION I (Federalist Society 1986); Antonin Scalia,
Originalism:The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849 (1989). Less well known, but equally
deserving of acknowledgement, are the largely unrecorded efforts of people like Steve
Calabresi, John Harrison, and Lee Liberman.
4. For what it is worth, I am presently in the process of solving the first problem, but
I would gladly accept some help with the latter two. See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law,
86 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992).
5. Indeed, it only addresses one-third of the problem if "original" and "meaning"
are in fact separable concepts that require separate justifications. See Gary Lawson, In
Praise of Woodenness, II GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 21, 22 n.8 (1988).
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defendant wearing a blue suit? The law has an elaborate set of
rules, the familiar rules of evidence, that tell us which things
are permitted to count for and against any particular answer to
that question. A theory of interpretation serves, inter alia, the
same function in determining the meaning of legal texts as do
the rules of evidence in determining the legal truth of factual
propositions. 6 That is, your theory of interpretation tells you
what to look for, what is admissible, in determining-the truth
value of any proposition about a given text. 7 For example, interpretivism tells you to look for constitutional answers in the
document's text, structure, and history; noninterpretivism
might tell you instead to look for answers in the collected
speeches of Senator Howard Metzenbaum. In either case, the
theory of interpretation dictates the nature of the inquiry.
But having a theory of interpretation, like having rules of evidence, does not by itself yield answers to particular questions.
You also need to know how much of whatever your guiding theory tells you to look for you must find before you can establish
that an interpretation is correct or that a fact has been proven.
For example, in the case of the allegedly blue-suited defendant,
precisely the same evidence admitted pursuant to precisely the
same rules of evidence can yield different legal conclusions in
civil and criminal trials, because the quantum of admissible evidence needed to prove factual propositions differs in the two
contexts. Similarly, it is not enough to have a theory of interpretation that tells you to look for the public meaning of words
in a text and that tells you what to count as evidence of that
public meaning; you also need to know how much evidence of
that public meaning is necessary before you can say that the
meaning of the text has been established.' Everyone, interpretivists and noninterpretivists alike, must address this problem;
to my knowledge, however, no systematic treatment of it has
been attempted. Until there is an answer, interpretivism, and
probably every other interpretative theory, is radically
incomplete.
6. Legal truth is not necessarily metaphysical, or ontological, truth. For a variety of
policy reasons, the rules of evidence can and do tell you not to consider evidence that is
in fact probative.
7. A theory of interpretation may also do more by telling you not only what evidence
is admissible, but also how much weight to attach to the evidence. At the very least,
however, it serves this admissibility-screening function.
8. The answer to the "how much" question can be explicit or implicit, absolute or
comparative, cardinal or ordinal; but there must be an answer.

160

HarvardJournal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 15

Once the interpretative problem has been solved and you
can confidently declare that "the meaning" of a particular constitutional provision is "X," the next question is whether anyone in particular, such as a judge or a law clerk, should care
about that meaning. This question is not trivial. If interpretivism is the correct theory of constitutional interpretation, as I
think it is, then interpretivists can fairly say that if you want to
interpret and apply the Constitution, you must, as a matter of
instrumental morality, use interpretivism. That conclusion
leaves unexplained, however, why interpreting and applying
the Constitution is a desirable goal.
The standard response is to invoke some process-based theory of authority, which usually amounts to a variant of "the
consent of the governed" theme: The Constitution as written is
what "the people" ratified, so shut up and apply it. Arguments
of this kind, however, simply do not work. They did not work
for Socrates; they did not work for John Locke; and they will
not work for interpretivists. 9 Interestingly, the demise of intentionalism may serve to make the gaps in the standard normative
case for interpretivism more evident than before. If you believe
in some kind of contractual, consent-based theory of constitutional justification, then it makes sense to look to the intentions
of those persons who did the consenting-in this case a relatively small group of Framers and ratifiers acting pursuant to
an assumed, if patently nonexistent, delegation of authority. In
other words, a "consent of the governed" theory of justification makes traditional intentionalism look more attractive than
it really is as a theory of interpretation. Once intentionalism is
jettisoned, it becomes easier to lead people back up the logical
chain to reexamine the soundness of the underlying theory of
justification.
This point bears emphasis: To say that interpretivism is the
correct way to ascertain the meaning of the Constitution by itself says nothing about how public officials should make decisions. I do think that there are persuasive arguments for why
the Constitution should be considered binding on government
officials, but those arguments, which involve a mixture of substantive political theory and rule-of-law process concerns, have
9. The problem with tacit consent is that it is almost always about one hundred parts
tacit to one part consent.
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yet to be developed.' °
Finally, assuming that we can confidently say that a particular
judicial interpretation is inconsistent with the Constitution and
that consistency with the Constitution is a desirable goal for
judicial interpretation, the problem of what to do with the incorrect interpretations that fill the pages of the national reporters still remains. As far as federal courts are concerned, the
problem of precedent seems to lend itself to textual analysis.
Article III vests "the judicial Power... in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish."" The question for interpretivists is
therefore straightforward: In 1789, did "the judicial Power" include the power to decide cases in accordance with prior decisions, even when those prior decisions contradict the text of
the Constitution or a statute, and if so, to what extent and
under what circumstances? Although I may not know the answer, I am quite certain that this is the correct question. 2 Of
course, even answering this question does not necessarily tell
us how state courts or other government officials ought to treat
federal court precedents, but three problems are probably
enough for now.

10. Randy Barnett has taken the first steps towards developing such a theory. See
Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: The Ninth Amendment and ConstitutionalLegitimacy, 64 CHli.K Nr L. Rsv. 37 (1988). I have some serious reservations about Professor Barnett's
analysis, but he is asking the right questions.
11. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
12. See Gary Lawson, TerritorialGovernments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CAL. L. REv.
853, 870 n.91 (1990).

